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Removing Police From Schools Using State Law
Heightened Scrutiny
Christina Payne-Tsoupros*
ABSTRACT
This Article argues that school police, often called school resource officers, interfere
with the state law right to education and proposes using the constitutional right to
education under state law as a mechanism to remove police from schools.
Disparities in school discipline for Black and brown children are well-known. After
discussing the legal structures of school policing, this Article uses the Disability Critical
Race Theory (DisCrit) theoretical framework developed by Subini Annamma, David
Connor, and Beth Ferri to explain why police are unacceptable in schools. Operating
under the premise that school police are unacceptable, this Article then analyzes
mechanisms to effect the abolition of police in schools, focusing on solutions to school
policing that are consistent with DisCrit principles.
This Article proposes using the state law constitutional right to education as that
mechanism. Every state, in its constitution, provides for some form of a right to education.
While an imperfect solution, this Article considers the state constitutional right to
education as an approach to remove police from schools with broader ramifications for
dismantling the school-to-prison pipeline.
Keywords: school police, resource officers, right to education, state law, heightened
scrutiny, race, Disability Critical Race Theory, abolition, constitutional law, school-toprison pipeline
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CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
School police are a common presence in elementary and secondary schools across
the nation. The National Center for Education Statistics found that 51.2% of K–12 schools
had a sworn law enforcement officer1 during the 2017-2018 school year.2 School police,
often called “school resource officers” (SROs), are fully commissioned police officers
assigned to a particular school or set of schools.3 The stated purposes and goals of SROs
U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Stats., Percentage of Public Schools with Security Staff Present
at School at Least Once a Week, by Type of Security Staff, School Level, and Selected School
Characteristics: 2005–06, 2015–16, and 2017–18, DIGEST OF EDUC. STATS. tbl. 233.70b (2019),
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d19/tables/dt19_233.70b.asp (“School Resource Officers (SROs)
include all career sworn law enforcement officers with arrest authority who have specialized training and
are assigned to work in collaboration with school organizations. Under ‘[a]ny sworn law enforcement
officers,’ schools that reported having both SROs and other sworn law enforcement officers were counted
only once.”).
2
Id.
3
Federal law includes two definitions of “school resource officer.” Under the Safe and Drug Free Schools
and Communities Act, an SRO is:
[A] career law enforcement officer, with sworn authority, deployed in communityoriented policing, and assigned by the employing police department to a local educational
agency to work in collaboration with school and community based organizations to-(A) educate students in crime and illegal drug use prevention and safety;
(B) develop or expand community justice initiatives for students; and
(C) train students in conflict resolution, restorative justice, and crime and illegal drug use
awareness.
20 U.S.C. § 7161.
Under the Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act:
“[S]chool resource officer” means a career law enforcement officer, with sworn
authority, deployed in community-oriented policing, and assigned by the employing
police department or agency to work in collaboration with schools and community-based
1

2
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include addressing crime issues in and around schools, developing crime prevention
programs, training students in conflict resolution, serving as a resource to school staff
members, and developing safety protocols for schools.4 At best, research remains mixed as
to whether SROs effectuate these objectives.5
While SROs are not typically expected to be involved in school discipline, in
practice, they often are actively involved. Across all levels of school discipline, including
interactions with school police, Black children face disproportionate levels of punishment.
For the 2017–2018 school year, Black students represented 15.1% of nationwide publicschool enrollment, yet 28.7% of the students referred to law enforcement and 31.6% of the
students subject to school-based arrest.6 This disproportionate distribution of punishment
also holds true within the population of disabled students. According to the Department of
Education’s Office for Civil Rights, for the 2017-2018 school year, students with
disabilities represented 13.2% of student enrollment,7 yet 26.1% of the students referred to
law enforcement and 25.8% of the students subject to school-based arrest.8 Within the
population of disabled students, these discrepancies across racial lines remain consistent.
For the 2017-2018 school year, Black students represented 17.7%9 of the students receiving
special education services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement
Act (the federal special education law), yet 32% of the students referred to law enforcement
and 35.3% of the students subject to school-based arrest.10
organizations—
(A) to address crime and disorder problems, gangs, and drug activities affecting or
occurring in or around an elementary or secondary school;
(B) to develop or expand crime prevention efforts for students;
(C) to educate likely school-age victims in crime prevention and safety;
(D) to develop or expand community justice initiatives for students;
(E) to train students in conflict resolution, restorative justice, and crime awareness;
(F) to assist in the identification of physical changes in the environment that may reduce
crime in or around the school; and
(G) to assist in developing school policy that addresses crime and to recommend
procedural changes.
34 U.S.C. § 10389(4).
4
See infra Part I.0
5
See infra Part I.0
6
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFF. FOR C.R., AN OVERVIEW OF EXCLUSIONARY DISCIPLINE PRACTICES IN PUBLIC
SCHOOLS FOR THE 2017-18 SCHOOL YEAR 3, 21 (2021), https://ocrdata.ed.gov/assets/downloads/crdcexclusionary-school-discipline.pdf [hereinafter, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFF. FOR C.R., AN OVERVIEW OF
EXCLUSIONARY DISCIPLINE PRACTICES]. This disparity across racial lines has continued from prior years.
For example, for the 2015-2016 school year, Black students represented 15% of nationwide public-school
enrollment, yet 31% of students who were arrested or referred to law enforcement. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
OFF. FOR C.R., 2015–16 CIVIL RIGHTS DATA COLLECTION: SCHOOL CLIMATE AND SAFETY 3 (2018),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/school-climate-and-safety.pdf [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF
EDUC., OFF. FOR C.R., 2015–16 CIVIL RIGHTS DATA COLLECTION].
7
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFF. FOR C.R., AN OVERVIEW OF EXCLUSIONARY DISCIPLINE PRACTICES, supra
note 6, at 13.
8
Ed.gov, 2017-18 State and National Estimations, CIVIL RIGHTS DATA COLLECTION, available at
https://ocrdata.ed.gov/estimations/2017-2018 (select “School Climate” then “Arrests” to view data on
2017-2018 referrals to law enforcement and school-based arrests).
9
Id. (select “Student Enrollment” then “2017-18 Estimations for Enrollment” to view data on enrollment of
students receiving services under the IDEA).
10
Id.; see also DANIEL J. LOSEN, PAUL MARTINEZ, & GRACE HAE RIM SHIN, THE CTR. FOR C.R. REMEDIES,
DISABLING INEQUITY: THE URGENT NEED FOR RACE-CONSCIOUS RESOURCE REMEDIES 42–43 (2021),
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Despite these disparities, SROs continue to be prevalent in schools, causing children
to be harmed. In fall of 2019, an SRO in Orlando, Florida arrested two six-year-old
children; the incident was widely publicized in the mainstream media. 11 One of the
children, a first-grader, had a temper tantrum in class and was charged with battery.12 While
there may be short-lived shock and outrage among the general public when an SRO arrests
a Black first-grader, handcuffs a Black third-grader,13 or punches a Black high-school
student in the face, sending him sprawling to the ground,14 these events currently tend to
be treated as isolated incidents rather than parts of a pervasive system of criminalizing and
hurting children.
This Article argues that these discrepancies across race and disability, coupled with
the threat and harm that SROs pose to Black students, particularly Black disabled students,
make the presence of police in schools unacceptable. This Article uses Disability Critical
Race Theory (DisCrit) to analyze school police reform and abolition efforts and proposes
a mechanism to effect abolition. Much of the current academic scholarship advocates for
various reforms to improve school policing, while leaving its infrastructure largely intact.
This Article rejects reform, instead advocating for abolition of school police.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I begins by examining the legal structure of
SROs. This Part positions the current era of school police as an outgrowth of the “tough on
crime” era of the 1980s and 1990s. This Part also considers the different roles of SROs and
summarizes research on their effectiveness.
Part II of this Article uses the DisCrit theoretical framework developed by Professors
Subini Annamma, David Connor, and Beth Ferri to illustrate how SROs may pose different
risks to Black children, particularly Black children with disabilities.15 This Part then
examines the Police Free Schools Movement under a DisCrit analysis, which has received
increased national attention in the current political climate. This Part explores some of the
differences in reform measures versus abolition and concludes with a discussion of what
schools could look like if police were removed and the respective funds associated with
school police were thus reinvested in other sources.
Part III considers legal theories that would allow for removal of police from schools,
https://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/special-education/disabling-inequity-theurgent-need-for-race-conscious-resource-remedies/final-Report-03-22-21-v5-corrected.pdf (reporting racial
disparities in referrals to law enforcement among disabled students in selected large districts). From the
Department of Education’s Civil Rights Data Collection, for this analysis, Losen et al. limited the pool of
samples to those schools that enrolled a minimum of 100 Black secondary students with disabilities. Id. at
42. In 2018, the U.S. Government Accountability Office reported that for the 2013-2014 school year,
among Black disabled students, Black students represented 19% of the population yet comprised 36% of
the students who were arrested or referred to law enforcement. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO18-258, K-12 EDUCATION: DISCIPLINE DISPARITIES FOR BLACK STUDENTS, BOYS, AND STUDENTS WITH
DISABILITIES 16 (2018).
11
See, e.g., Mariel Padilla, Orlando Officer Is Terminated After Arresting 6-Year-Olds, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/23/us/6-year-old-orlando-florida.html.
12
Id.
13
Elizabeth A. Shaver & Janet R. Decker, Handcuffing a Third Grader? Interactions Between School
Resource Officers and Students with Disabilities, 2017 UTAH L. REV. 229, 229–30 (2017).
14
Video Shows Indianapolis Police Officer Punching Student Outside High School, FOX 2 NOW (Aug. 30,
2019), https://fox2now.com/news/video-shows-indianapolis-police-officer-punching-student-outside-highschool/.
15
Subini Ancy Annamma, David J. Connor & Beth A. Ferri, Dis/ability Critical Race Studies (DisCrit):
Theorizing at the Intersections of Race and Dis/ability, 16 J. RACE ETHNICITY & EDUC 5 (2013).
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with the intent of proposing changes that are consistent with DisCrit. To that end, Part III
focuses on how the use of SROs can be subject to heightened judicial scrutiny. Specifically,
this Article considers Professor Derek Black’s 2016 article proposing using state law to
subject school expulsion and suspension practices to heightened scrutiny. This Article
proposes extending this theory to encompass the use of SROs.16 This Part then situates this
proposal in the context of DisCrit. This Part also recognizes and addresses limitations of
this proposal, with respect to both legal and political anticipated challenges.
In closing, this Article addresses important related areas for future study, including
other populations of children who may be at risk of harm from SROs and issues with school
policing that have developed amid the COVID-19 pandemic.17
I. STRUCTURE OF SCHOOL POLICING
This Part provides a brief overview of school policing in the United States. Federal
law provides the infrastructure for school policing by providing conditions for funding.
The authority to install police in schools comes from state (or local) law, school board
policies, and/or school board contracts with law enforcement.18
There is significant variation among school policing structures from state-to-state
and district-to-district. In addition to the variations in school policing structures, the actual
number of police in schools remains unknown. For example, the National Association of
School Resource Officers (NASRO) estimates that there are 14,000 to 20,000 SROs
deployed in schools nationwide.19 The National Center for Education Statistics reported
that there were at least 52,100 SROs (full and part-time) staffed in public schools in 201516.20 An additional complexity occurs in the employment structure of SROs. In some
jurisdictions, the school district itself employs the SRO. However, in most jurisdictions,
the local law enforcement agency employs SROs.21 The variations in employment structure
contribute to the lack of transparency in the number of SROs, as well as to oversight and
accountability issues, as school personnel have less control (including hiring and firing
authority) over officers employed by the law enforcement agency.
This Part sets forth a brief history of school policing, particularly the federal laws of
the 1980s and 1990s that set the stage for the modern era of school policing. This Part then
discusses the roles and functions of school police officers and summarizes research on the
16

Derek W. Black, Reforming School Discipline, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (2016).
Given the broad scope of disability, this Article interchangeably uses identity-first (e.g., “disabled
children”) and person-first language (e.g., “children with disabilities”).
18
For a comprehensive report of school policing across the country, see ADVANCEMENT PROJECT & ALL.
FOR EDUC. JUST., WE CAME TO LEARN: A CALL TO ACTION FOR POLICE-FREE SCHOOLS (2019),
https://advancementproject.org/wecametolearn/.
19
NAT’L ASS’N OF SCH. RES. OFFICERS, Frequently Asked Questions, https://www.nasro.org/faq/ (last
visited Oct. 13, 2021).
20
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., 2015–16 SCHOOL SURVEY ON CRIME AND SAFETY
(SSOCS) tbl. 1 (2016), https://nces.ed.gov/surveys/ssocs/tables/tab_my01_2016_all.asp (listing number of
school resource officers, number of public schools, and the number of public schools with school resource
officers, by full- and part-time school resource officer status: 2003–04 through 2015–16). As of the time of
publication, this is the most recent available estimate of the number of SROs by the National Center for
Education Statistics.
21
Jason P. Nance, Students, Police, and the School-to-Prison Pipeline, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 919, 946
(2016).
17
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effectiveness of school police.
A. Brief History of School Policing
While police have been assigned to schools since the 1940s,22 the current version of
school policing is often tied to the 1999 massacre at Columbine High School. As the first
mass shooting caught on camera, the shooting “forever alter[ed] society’s view of school
policing.”23 Enhanced security measures, including increased funding for SROs, often
receive heightened attention and funding in the aftermath of mass school shootings.24
While the tragedies of widely publicized school shootings are often the impetus for
increased SRO presence, the “tough on crime” and “three strikes” laws and culture of the
1980s established the legal framework to do so. Following the 1988 failed presidential bid
of Democratic nominee Michael Dukakis, Democratic politicians were keen to appear
“tough on crime” in their law making and public messaging.25 This political shift to be
“tough on crime” contributed to the zero tolerance regimes of the 1990s, which are still
reflected in schools today. This section briefly outlines these laws and policies, for
purposes of providing the context for the current era of school policing.
As part of the “War on Drugs,” the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 198626 incorporated
enhanced penalties for drug offenses that dispropriationately affected Black and brown
adults.27 These stricter penalties includes so-called “three strikes” laws (also called habitual
offender laws), which imposed strict penalties, including up to life imprisonment as well

22

ADVANCEMENT PROJECT & ALL. FOR EDUC. JUST., supra note 18, at 17 (citing Ben Brown,
Understanding and Assessing School Police Officers: A Conceptual and Methodological Comment, 34 J.
CRIM. JUST. 591 (2006)); see also CATHY GIROUARD, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFF. OF JUST. REFORMS, OFF. OF
JUV. JUST. AND DELINQ. PREVENTION, SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICER TRAINING PROGRAM (2001).
23
ADVANCEMENT PROJECT & ALL. FOR EDUC. JUST., supra note 18, at 22; see also Danielle Weatherby,
Student Discipline and the Active Avoidance Doctrine, 54 UC DAVIS L. REV. 491, 503–04 (2020) (“after a
series of school shootings beginning with the one at Columbine High School, the public became
increasingly concerned about violence among students, and the [Gun Free Schools Act] was aimed at
minimizing what was perceived to be a grave risk to student safety” (internal citations omitted)).
24
ADVANCEMENT PROJECT & ALL. FOR EDUC. JUST., supra note 18, at 22.
25
Michael Dukakis’s failed presidential bid stood in recent memory as a cautionary tale for Democratic
politicians who risked appearing soft on crime. During the 1988 presidential campaign, George H.W. Bush
criticized Michael Dukakis as soft on crime by tying him to Willie Horton. Horton, a Black man who had
been convicted of murder, was allowed a weekend furlough and was subsequently convicted of assault,
armed, robbery, and rape for actions committed during the furlough. The Horton ad, coupled with
Dukakis’s weak debate performance on the issue of capital punishment, was considered devastating for the
Dukakis campaign. Beth Schwartzapfel & Bill Keller, Wille Horton Revisited, THE MARSHALL PROJECT
(May 13, 2015), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/05/13/willie-horton-revisited#. In contrast,
during the 1992 campaign, Arkansas governor and presidential hopeful Bill Clinton denied the appeal for
clemency for and oversaw the execution of Ricky Ray Rector, a mentally disabled inmate who was
executed. Peter Abblebome, The 1992 Campaign: Death Penalty; Arkansas Execution Raises Questions on
Governor’s Politics, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 1992), https://www.nytimes.com/1992/01/25/us/1992-campaigndeath-penalty-arkansas-execution-raises-questions-governor-s.html.
26
21 U.S.C. § 801.
27
For a timeline and summary of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, see Arit John, A Timeline of the Rise
and Fall of ‘Tough on Crime’ Drug Sentencing, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 22, 2014),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/04/a-timeline-of-the-rise-and-fall-of-tough-on-crimedrug-sentencing/360983/.
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as mandatory minimum sentences for certain drug-related offenses.28
During this era, Congress modeled its juvenile offender laws after the strict and
punitive adult offender laws.29 In 1994, President Bill Clinton signed into law two bills that
had profound implications for the future of school policing. The Gun Free Schools Act of
199430 made statewide receipt of federal funds contingent on schools adopting “zero
tolerance” policies, which required automatic expulsion from school for certain offenses.31
The Gun Free Schools Act created new student-police interaction, as the Act required
school districts receiving federal funds to have a policy in place obligating school officials
to refer to law enforcement any students who bring weapons to school.32 During this time,
some states also passed laws criminalizing student misbehavior, thereby creating additional
student-police interaction.33
Also in 1994, the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act 34 created the
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (“COPS”).35 As explained by the
Advancement Project and the Alliance for Educational Justice (AEJ), the COPS program
created the COPS in Schools grant, which dramatically increased the number of police in
schools.36 Other factors contributed to the expansion of policing in this era, including, as
Professor Jason Nance explained, students’ limited constitutional rights at school.37
Thus, while Columbine—and every mass school shooting since—brought increased
attention to school policing to the forefront, the groundwork for the modern presence of
police in schools began in the 1980s.
28

Id.
Nance, supra note 21, at 930–31 (describing the public “moral panic” with the increase in rates of
juvenile violent crime from the mid-1980s to mid-1990s (quoting Donna M. Bishop & Barry C. Feld,
Juvenile Justice in the Get Tough Era, ENCYC. OF CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIM. JUST. 2766, 2768 (Gerben
Bruinsma & Davis Weisburd eds., 2014))).
30
20 U.S.C. § 7161. For an in-depth analysis of the implications of zero-tolerance policies on school
discipline, see Avarita L. Hanson, Have Zero Tolerance School Discipline Policies Turned into a
Nightmare? The American Dream’s Promise of Equal Educational Opportunity Grounded in Brown v.
Board of Education, 9 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 289 (2005). “Zero tolerance policies emerged into the
realm of public education when Congress passed the Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994.” Weatherby, supra
note 23, at 503 (citation omitted); see also id. at 497–503 (tracing the history of school discipline through
its history of corporal punishment to exclusionary practices such as out-of-school suspensions and
expulsions. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), schools shifted
to the use of in-school suspension as alternatives to out-of-school suspensions and expulsions).
31
See Nance, supra note 21, at 932–34 (summarizing provisions of the Gun Free Schools Act).
32
See Jason P. Nance, Rethinking Law Enforcement Officers in Schools, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
ARGUENDO 151, 154 (2016) (citation omitted).
33
Id.
34
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103–322, 108 Stat. 1796.
35
See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., https://cops.usdoj.gov/ (last
visited Oct. 13, 2021).
36
ADVANCEMENT PROJECT & ALL. FOR EDUC. JUST., supra note 18, at 22.
37
Jason P. Nance, Dismantling the School-to-Prison Pipeline: Tools for Change, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 313,
328–29 (2016). In addition to the weakening of students’ constitutional rights in this era, Nance also cites
the development of high-stakes testing laws, which had “the unintended consequence of encouraging
schools to push out ‘problem’ or low-performing students to improve schools’ overall performance on
high-stakes achievement tests.” Id. at 329–30; Jason P. Nance, School Surveillance and the Fourth
Amendment, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 79, 94–95 (2014); see also Weatherby, supra note 23, at 506–07 (noting
that “[m]any states also adopted statutory mechanisms that allowed for the arming of teachers during the
school day, charging classroom teachers with quasi-security guard duties” (internal citation omitted)).
29
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B. Roles and Effectiveness of SROs
Often described as a “triad model,” SROs have three main roles: as educators,
counselors, and law-enforcement officers.38 This model conceptualizes that the SRO will
fill the educator role by guest lecturing; the counselor role by intervening and assisting in
student conflict issues; and the law-enforcement officer role by “handl[ing] school-related
matters that police traditionally would have handled, including off-campus activities that
involve students, making arrests or issuing citations on campus for particular conduct, and
taking action against unauthorized persons on school grounds.”39 This Article is
particularly focused on the law-enforcement role.
A recent article by Professors Benjamin W. Fisher and Deanna N. Devlin is
instructive to conceptualize how the triad model plays out in day-to-day school life. Fisher
and Devlin released the results of a national longitudinal study in which they empirically
derived three common role profiles of SROs, which they named (i) Low Engagement
(infrequently engaged in typical SRO tasks, more of a “presence” in schools); (ii) Full
Triad (engaged in mentoring and teaching as well as law enforcement activities); and (iii)
Reactionary (engaged primarily in law enforcement activities).40 Fisher and Devlin noted
that previous studies on the effects of SROs focused on their presence or absence, but did
not address nor account for the fact that an individual SRO’s role within a school can vary
across the responsibilities envisioned by the triad model. Fisher and Devlin therefore
focused on “identifying patterns of [SRO] roles that are particularly common.”41 They
based their analysis on interviews with school principals regarding whether the SROs
assigned to their campuses engaged in the following common SRO activities:
(a) security enforcement and patrol,
(b) maintaining school discipline and safety,
(c) coordination with local police and emergency team,
(d) identifying problems in the school and proactively seeking solutions to
those problems,
(e) training teachers and staff in school safety or crime prevention,
(f) mentoring students, and
NAT’L ASS’N OF SCH. RES. OFFICERS, supra note 19 (“NASRO considers it a best practice to use a ‘triad
concept’ to define the three main roles of school resource officers: educator (i.e. guest lecturer), informal
counselor/mentor, and law enforcement officer”); BARBARA RAYMOND, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFF. OF
CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., ASSIGNING POLICE OFFICERS TO SCHOOLS 3–6 (2010),
https://rems.ed.gov/docs/DOJ_AssigningPoliceOfficers.pdf (stating that “the three most typical roles of
SROs are safety expert and law enforcer, problem solver and liaison to community resources, and
educator”); see also, e.g., Shaver & Decker, supra note 13, at 235 (describing the triad model of the SRO as
“law enforcement officer, law-related counselor, and law-related education teacher” (citing Kerrin C. Wolf,
Arrest Decision Making by School Resource Officers, 12 YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 137, 138 (2014))).
39
Shaver & Decker, supra note 13, at 235 (citing NATHAN JAMES & GAIL MCCALLION, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R43126, SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICERS: LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS IN SCHOOLS 2 (2013)); see
also, id. (noting that the triad model is incorporated into the definitions of SRO that is set forth in federal
law, specifically 20 U.S.C. § 7161(11) (2012) (repealed 2015) and 42 U.S.C. § 3769dd-8(4) (2012)).
40
Benjamin W. Fisher & Deanna N. Devlin, School Crime and the Patterns of Roles of School Resource
Officers: Evidence from a National Longitudinal Study, 65 CRIME & DELINQ. 1, 9 (2019).
41
Id. at 4.
38
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(g) teaching a law-related education course or training students (e.g., drugrelated education, criminal law or crime prevention courses).42
This framing of role profiles can be helpful to understand how children interface with
SROs in schools, as it identified the specific activities in which SROs were most commonly
engaged. Fisher and Devlin noted that schools with Reactionary SROs also used other
enhanced security measures, including locked/monitored doors, had clear book bag
policies, and required student ID badges more than schools with other SRO profiles.43
Fisher and Devlin’s findings appear consistent with other research, which found that,
despite the triad model, SROs spend most of their time engaged in law enforcement
activities.44
With respect to the overall effectiveness of SROs at improving school safety,
research remains mixed, at best. Citing a study from the Center for American Progress,
Professor Maryam Ahranjani reported: “[T]here is no evidence-based support for the idea
that having police officers stationed in public schools deters crime or makes schools
safer.”45 This finding is particularly true with respect to research regarding school resources
as a deterrent or solution to school shootings.
Further, according to the Congressional Research Service Report:
The body of research on the effectiveness of SRO programs is noticeably
limited, both in terms of the number of studies published and
methodological rigor of the studies conducted. The research that is available
draws conflicting conclusions about whether SRO programs are effective at
reducing school violence. In addition, the research does not address whether
SRO programs deter school shootings, one of the key reasons for renewed
congressional interest in these programs.46
Despite the absence of research on whether SROs are, in fact, effective at deterring
school shootings, school shootings often serve as an impetus for increasing numbers of and
funding for SROs. With respect to school safety more generally, Nance summarizes
existing research on SROs in his 2016 article “Rethinking Law Enforcement Officers in
42

Id. at 8.
Id. at 10–11.
44
See RAYMOND, supra note 38, at 6 (citing surveys that report SROs spend “at least half their time
engaging in law enforcement activities.”); Shaver & Decker, supra note 13, at 235 (“although the triad
model is the proposed model for SRO responsibilities, several studies have shown that SROs spend a
majority of their time in law enforcement activities.” (citing David C. May & George E. Higgins, The
Characteristics and Activities of School Resource Officers: Are Newbies Different than Veterans?, 11 J.
POLICE CRISIS NEGOTS. 96, 98 (2011)); Chongmin Na & Denise C. Gottsfredson, Police Officers in
Schools: Effects on School Crime and Processing of Offending Behaviors, 30 JUST. Q. 619, 633 (2013)).
45
Maryam Ahranjani, School “Safety” Measures Jump Constitutional Guardrails, 44 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
273, 281 (2021) (citing Bayliss Fiddiman, Ashley Jeffrey & Scott Sargrad, Smart Investments for Safer
Schools, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/education-k12/reports/2018/12/19/464445/smart-investments-safer-schools/); see also, e.g., Christopher A. Mallet, The
School-to-Prison Pipeline: A Critical Review of the Punitive Paradigm Shift, 33 CHILD & ADOLESCENT
SOC. WORK J. 15, 21 (2016) (“The major policy problem is that the utilization of police officers in schools
in significantly greater than the evidence of their positive impact on school safety.”).
46
JAMES & MCCALLION, supra note 39, at 10–11.
43
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Schools,” noting that while research is unclear on whether SROs are effective at preventing
school violence, there is research evidencing the drawbacks of SROs.47 Nance cites
research on the numerous costs of SROs, including findings that SROs “can harm the
learning climate by alienating students and generating mistrust” and “contribute to the socalled ‘school-to-prison pipeline’ by unnecessarily involving students in the justice
system.”48 Nance’s empirical study found that SROs’ regular presence at schools predicted
greater odds of referral to law enforcement for lower-level infractions.49 Nance also cites
evidence that “SROs themselves arrest students on their own accord for routine discipline
matters, even over the objection of school officials or teachers” and that SRO programs are
extremely costly to the school district, particularly if more experienced officers are
involved.50 Thus, school policing disproportionately inflicts harm on Black children,
including Black disabled children, in the absence of evidence demonstrating that school
police make schools safer overall.
II. DISCRIT ANALYSIS OF SCHOOL POLICING
The “school-to-prison pipeline” refers to the national trend where children
(predominantly minority and socioeconomically disadvantaged children) are pushed out of
school and into the criminal justice system.51 According to a Dear Colleague letter issued
by the U.S. Departments of Justice and Education: “National, state, and local data across
all settings and at all school levels clearly demonstrate that school administrators and
teachers discipline minority students, particularly African-American students, more
harshly and more frequently than similarly-situated white students.”52 There is no evidence
that Black children misbehave in schools at greater rates than white children. 53 Yet, as
stated previously, Black students comprise 15.1% of the population, yet represent 28.7%
of the students referred to law enforcement and 31.6% of the students subject to schoolbased arrest.54
Students with disabilities are disproportionately disciplined in schools, compared

47

Nance, supra note 32, at 153 (citing JAMES & MCCALLION, supra note 39).
Id. at 154.
49
Nance, supra note 21, at 975–76; see also Nance, supra note 32, at 154–55 (discussing same).
50
Nance, supra note 32, at 155.
51
See, e.g., ACLU, School-to-Prison Pipeline, https://www.aclu.org/issues/juvenile-justice/school-prisonpipeline (last visited Oct. 13, 2021); see also Nance, supra note 21, at 923 (“the term ‘school-to-prison
pipeline’ (‘Pipeline’) connotes the intersection of the K–12 public education system and law enforcement,
and the trend of referring students directly to law enforcement for committing offenses at school or creating
conditions that increase the probability of students eventually becoming incarcerated, such as suspending or
expelling them” (citation omitted)).
52
Nance, supra note 37, at 318 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., DEAR COLLEAGUE
LETTER ON NONDISCRIMINATORY ADMINISTRATION OF SCHOOL DISCIPLINE 3 (2014),
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr//letters/colleague-201401-title-vi.pdf).
53
See, e.g., Sarah E. Redfield & Jason P. Nance, American Bar Association Joint Task Force on Reversing
the School-to-Prison Pipeline, 47 U. MEM. L. REV. 20–30 (2016) (“the concerning differences and
disproportionality are not simply attributed to the stigmatized group behaving ‘badly’ relative to their peers
or socioeconomic factors” (internal citation omitted)).
54
See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFF. FOR C.R., AN OVERVIEW OF EXCLUSIONARY DISCIPLINE PRACTICES,
supra note 6.
48
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to nondisabled peers, including via referral to law enforcement and school-based arrest.55
In the 2015-2016 school year, Black students with disabilities, while comprising 17.7% of
the student population with disabilities, represented 32% of students with disabilities
referred to law enforcement and 35.3% of students subjected to school-based arrest.56
Given the discrepancies in school discipline against Black children, this Article views the
“school safety” discussion as incomplete if it does not account for these disparities.
These disparities are not new, yet they persist. Part II of this Article analyzes school
policing using the DisCrit framework, which accounts for these disparities across racial
and disability lines. Beyond documenting demographic disparities, DisCrit focuses on why
Black students, particularly Black disabled students, face particular danger from school
police and uses DisCrit to argue that police should be removed from schools. This argument
does not claim that every person affected by school policing wants the abolition of school
police. Rather, this piece seeks to contextualize the argument for removal of school police
within DisCrit. This Part begins with a brief introduction of the DisCrit framework. Part II
draws on “A DisCrit Call for Abolition of School Police,” coauthored by this author and
DAWN Executive Director Najma Johnson in the forthcoming volume, DisCrit Expanded:
Inquiries, Reverberations & Ruptures, to analyze school policing via DisCrit and highlight
how traditional reforms are insufficient.57 This Part then situates the call for Police Free
Schools within the broader abolitionist movement and briefly describe a picture of “police
free schools.”
A. Disability Critical Race Theory (DisCrit)
DisCrit is an intersectional58 framework that grew out of Critical Race Theory and
Disability Studies.59 DisCrit “incorporates a dual analysis of race and ability” and analyzes
“why the location of being both a person of color and a person labeled with a dis/ability is
qualitatively different for students of color than white students with a dis/ability.”60
Formally introduced by Professors Subini Annamma, David Connor, and Beth Ferri in their
2013 article, “Dis/ability Critical Race Studies (DisCrit): Theorizing at the Intersections of
Race and Dis/ability,” DisCrit’s origins lie in the field of special education.61 Special
55

Jyoti A. Nanda, The Construction and Criminalization of Disability in School Incarceration, 9 COLUM. J.
RACE & L. 265, 294–95 (2019) (citing Courtney Perkes, Report: Students with Disabilities Disciplined
Twice as Often as Peers, DISABILITY SCOOP (Feb. 28, 2018),
https://www.disabilityscoop.com/2018/02/28/report-disciplined-twice/24783/); Redfield & Nance, supra
note 53, at 64–70 (citing data from the U.S. Department of Education’s Civil Rights Data Collection and
other available local data as analyzed by the American Bar Association’s Joint Task Force on Reversing the
School-to-Prison Pipeline).
56
Ed.gov, supra notes 9–10.
57
Christina Payne-Tsoupros & Najma Johnson, A Discrit Call for Abolition of School Police, in DISCRIT
EXPANDED: INQUIRIES, REVERBERATIONS & RUPTURES (Subini A. Annamma, David J. Connor & Beth
Ferri eds., forthcoming 2022).
58
Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 140 UNIV. CHI. L. FORUM 139–67
(1989).
59
Annamma, Connor & Ferri, supra note 15, at 5.
60
Id. at 8.
61
Id.; see generally DISCRIT: DISABILITY STUDIES AND CRITICAL RACE THEORY IN EDUCATION (David J.
Connor, Beth A. Ferri & Subini A. Annamma eds.) (2016) [hereinafter DISCRIT: DISABILITY STUDIES AND
CRITICAL RACE THEORY IN EDUCATION] (1st volume; using DisCrit to address educational inequities).
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education and K–12 education represent microcosms of larger society and the racism,
ableism, and power structures in play.62 Annamma, Connor, and Ferri noted that “[t]he
ways in which over-representation of students of color in special education currently works
reinforces the racial hierarchies the U.S. subscribes to,” specifically, “the continual overrepresentation of African-Americans [in special education] across the United States,
regardless of social class, positions them as the continual problem in American
education.”63 Given the discrepancy in treatment by school police, particularly among
Black students with disabiliites, DisCrit is a useful theoretical lens to analyze school
policing.
Annamma, Connor, and Ferri developed seven tenets of DisCrit “to operationalize
what kinds of specific questions and issues can be illuminated from a DisCrit approach.”64
Because of DisCrit’s intersectional focus on race and disability, DisCrit allows for an
analysis of how racism and ableism work together to position Black students with
disabilities as exceptionally vulnerable to harm from school police. Specifically, DisCrit
contextualizes the power structures that enforce and reinforce the broader school policing
system as well as resistance thereto. DisCrit situates the current school policing
infrastructure in the broader legal and historical structure of school policing. In so doing,
DisCrit offers a challenge to the idea of reforming school police. DisCrit shows that reform
does not sufficiently acknowledge the unique vulnerability of Black disabled children to
school police.
B. Using DisCrit to Analyze School Policing
DisCrit demonstrates how current laws and policies are steeped in the country’s legal
and historical infrastructure. Black children with disabilities in schools reflect and connect
to the broader legal and historical contexts of how legal systems target Black disabled
adults today. Among the modern police killings of Black people, estimates are that one-

DISCRIT EXPANDED: INQUIRIES, REVERBERATIONS & RUPTURES (2d volume), supra note 57.
62
Annamma, Connor & Ferri, supra note 15.
63
Id. at 16 (citing Nirmala Erevelles, Anne Kanga & Renee Middleton, How Does It Feel to Be a Problem,
in WHO BENEFITS FROM SPECIAL EDUCATION? REMEDIATING (FIXING) OTHER PEOPLE’S CHILDREN 77–99
(E. Brantlinger ed., 2006)).
64
1. DisCrit focuses on ways that the forces of racism and ableism circulate
interdependently, often in neutralized and invisible ways, to uphold notions of normalcy.
2. DisCrit values multidimensional identities and troubles singular notions of identity
such as race or dis/ability or class or gender or sexuality, and so on.
3. DisCrit emphasizes the social constructions of race and ability yet recognizes the
material and psychological impacts of being labeled as raced or dis/abled, which sets one
outside of the western cultural norms.
4. DisCrit privileges voices of marginalized populations, traditionally not acknowledged
within research.
5. DisCrit considers legal and historical aspects of dis/ability and race and how both have
been used separately and together to deny the rights of some citizens.
6. DisCrit recognizes Whiteness and Ability as Property and that gains for people labeled
with dis/abilities have largely been made as the result of interest convergence of White,
middle-class citizens.
7. DisCrit requires activism and supports of all forms of resistance.
Annamma, Connor & Ferri, supra note 15, at 11.
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third to one-half of the killings are of Black disabled people.65 Much of the analysis under
DisCrit may apply also to Black children without disabilities as a result of racism and
ableism reinforcing each other. For example, with respect to “the law’s contribution to the
conception of disability,” Professor Zanita E. Fenton traces eugenics statutes and practices
to their racist origins following the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment.66 Further
explaining how law constructs views of disability, Nanda explains that the disproportionate
use of stigmatized disability categories was “predicted at the inception of the IDEA.”67
Nanda explains that while disability activists advocated for special schools for deaf and
blind children, the intelligence testing movement emerged among growing anti-immigrant
sentiment.68
In this way, DisCrit illustrates the law’s role in both reflecting and informing societal
views. The legal structures setting up the infrastructure for school policing go hand in hand
with the history of school policing. While enhanced policing was authorized as a response
to mass school shootings, its implementation bears little resemblance to that issue. Instead,
in effect it criminalized Black and brown children.
Drawing on research from Professors Jyoti Nanda, D.L. Adams, and Nirmala
Erevelles, Payne-Tsoupros and Johnson use DisCrit to show that Black children with
disabilities are situated differently than white peers with respect to SROs.69 Black children
are overrepresented in stigmatized disability categories, attend overpoliced and
underresourced schools, and are disproportionately subject to school based arrest.70 These
differences contribute to the disproportionate effect of school policing on Black children
with disabilities.
DisCrit requires analyzing how Black children, including Black children with
disabilities, experience a different position in schools compared to white peers and to
consider the legal and historical infrastructure that created and maintains these systems.
For example, Black children are more likely to be labeled with disabilities that reflect
subjective determinations by the teacher. These determinations for Black students often
include stigmatizing disability labels of emotional disturbance and intellectual disability,71
65

See Abigail Abrams, Black, Disabled and at Risk: The Overlooked Problem of Police Violence Against
Americans with Disabilities, TIME (June 25, 2020), https://time.com/5857438/police-violence-blackdisabled/.
66
Zanita E. Fenton, Disability Does Not Discriminate: Toward a Theory of Multiple Identity through
Coalition, in DISCRIT: DISABILITY STUDIES AND CRITICAL RACE THEORY IN EDUCATION, supra note 61, at
203, 204.
67
Nanda, supra note 55, at 283.
68
Id. at 283–85. Payne-Tsoupros & Johnson, supra note 57; see also Darrell D. Jackson, Teaching
Tomorrow’s Citizens: The Law’s Role in Educational Disproportionality, 5 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 215
(2014) (arguing that the laws “create racial disproportionality of youth placed into special education,
disciplined in schools, and funneled into the juvenile justice system,” using Colorado and the Rocky
Mountain states as examples).
69
Payne-Tsoupros & Johnson, supra note 57.
70
Id. (citing Nance, supra note 37, at 331–36; Redfield & Nance, supra note 53, at 51). In his empirical
study published in 2016, Jason Nance found that the percentage of enrollment in school of children of color
predicted the use of heightened security measures, including SROs. Nance, supra note 21, at 975–76.
71
D.L. Adams & Nirmala Erevelles, Shadow Play: DisCrit, Dis/Repspectability, and Carceral Logics, in
DISCRIT: DISABILITY STUDIES AND CRITICAL RACE THEORY IN EDUCATION, supra note 61, at 131, 135;
Nanda, supra note 55, at 307–14 (discussing the “so-called ‘soft disabilities,” such as emotional
disturbance that have “become catchalls for broad classes of learning challenges and antisocial behaviors
that are often applied to Black and Latinx children given the bias that may seep in during the attribution
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whereas white children demonstrating similar behaviors instead frequently receive
diagnoses of autism or ADHD.72 The differences in disability categorization among
children with disabilities contribute to the sorting and criminalization of Black students by
their disability.73 Nanda attributes the differences in disability labels among students with
disabilities to the subjectivity built into the [Individuals with Disabilities Education
Improvement Act of 2004, as amended],74 hyper-disciplined school environments, and
racial and cultural biases of teachers and administrators regarding the way Black and Latinx
students should act and perform.”75 In other words, the structure of the law, here, the IDEA,
coupled with school discipline culture and teacher expectations, leads to different disability
classifications across racial lines.
By offering a lens to challenge the status quo systems, DisCrit invites an approach
that challenges a system with its origins in enslavement and eugenics. In this way, DisCrit
invites a discussion of reform or abolition of school police as part of the broader system of
criminalization of school discipline, in a way that is consistent with the Police Free Schools
Movement. In contrast to traditional reforms, which generally seek to improve upon the
existing school policing model, the Police Free Schools Movement calls for more drastic
changes. The Police Free Schools Movement started receiving increased national attention
with the uprisings in spring and summer 2020 after the police killings of Breonna Taylor,
George Floyd, and others, alongside broader calls to defund the police. The Police Free
Schools Movement represents a collective of Black and brown youth-led advocacy groups.
The “collective definition” of Police Free Schools, developed by youth organizers in
partnership with AEJ is: “dismantling school policing infrastructure, culture, and practice;
ending school militarization and surveillance; and building a new liberatory education
system.”76
process”); Redfield & Nance, supra note 53, at 60–63; see also Steven L. Nelson, Special Education,
Overrepresentation, and End-Running Education Federalism: Theorizing Towards a Federally Protected
Right to Education for Black Students, 20 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 205 (2019).
72
Adams & Erevelles, supra note 71, at 137–38; see also LaToya Baldwin Clark, Beyond Bias: Cultural
Capital in Anti-Discrimination Law, 53 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 381 (2018) (discussing the advantageous
outcomes for children identified with autism and how autism has become coded “white;” compared to those
identified with emotional disturbance or intellectual disability, which have become coded “black”).
73
Adams & Erevelles, supra note 71, at 136–38; Nanda, supra note 55, at 314–20. Nanda explains that
children attending under resourced schools: are provided fewer special education resources, more likely to
be taught in segregated classrooms separate from their peers who are not disabled, more highly surveilled
and thereby disciplined, more likely to end up in a continuation school, and thus more likely to be
suspended, expelled, and criminalized. This is in sharp contrast to students in well-funded school districts
where . . . resources are more plentiful; there is a higher likelihood of teaching special education students in
mainstream classes (inclusion), less surveillance, more college counselors, more access to special education
resources, including attorneys, and students are thereby less likely to be suspended, expelled, and
criminalized. Nanda, supra note 55, at 315.
74
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (“IDEA”), is
the federal law guaranteeing children with disabilities the right to an education. Notably, the IDEA contains
procedural safeguards when disciplining children for behavior that may be a “manifestation of the child’s
disability.” 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.530-300.536.
75
Nanda, supra note 55, at 302 (citing Paul L. Morgan & George Farkas, The Wrong and Right Ways to
Ensure Equity in IDEA, EDUCATION NEXT (Aug. 10, 2016), https://www.educationnext.org/the-wrongand-right-ways-ensure-equity-idea/ (alteration in original)); Id. at 271 (“among children displaying the
same clinical needs, [w]hite children are more likely to receive special education services than racial or
ethnic minority children”).
76
Alliance for Educational Justice (@4EdJustice), TWITTER (May 30, 2020, 09:05 AM),
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The goals of the Police Free Schools Movement squarely confront the very practice
of school policing itself. Beyond the removal of officers, the Police Free Schools
Movement seeks investment in a “new liberatory education system.”77 In this way, the
Police Free Schools Movement explicitly establishes itself as abolitionist in nature in that
it demands a broad decarceralization of schools.
This section briefly discusses the Police Free Schools Movement using two advocacy
groups—Black Organizing Project in Oakland, California, and Black Swan Academy in
Washington, D.C—as examples. This section then considers the abolitionist framings of
Police Free Schools as it fits with DisCrit. This section concludes by envisioning “police
free school.”
1. Examples of Activism Within the Police Free Schools Movement
The youth and community-led activist groups at the forefront of the Police Free
Schools Movement call for the removal of school police and the dismantling of the greater
school policing infrastructure. For example, the Black Organizing Project (BOP) in
Oakland, California, is one of the longest running groups in the modern Police Free Schools
Movement. BOP launched its campaign to remove police from schools (“Bettering Our
School System”) following the murder of Raheim Brown, a twenty-year-old Black man
who was murdered in 2011 on school property by an Oakland school police officer.78
BOP’s demands included eliminating the Oakland School Police Department (a separate
agency from the Oakland Police Department), barring future contracts between the
Oakland Unified School District and law enforcement, and reinvesting those funds “into
increased supports for the whole child and for students with disabilities[, which] will more
effectively provide for student safety.”79 After over a decade of organizing and advocacy,
BOP earned a significant win on behalf of students and the community when the Board of
Education of the Oakland Unified School District passed Resolution No. 1920-0260, the
George Floyd Resolution to Eliminate the Oakland School Police Department. 80 The
resolution eliminated the separate Oakland School Police Department and directed the
superintendent to “reallocate the school police funds to student support positions.”81
In Washington, District of Columbia, in the 2018–2019 school year, Black children
represented 66% percent of the student population, and 92% of the school-based arrests.82
https://twitter.com/4EdJustice/status/1266732552678670336.
77
Id.
78
ADVANCEMENT PROJECT & ALL. FOR EDUC. JUST., supra note 18, at 70; BLACK ORGANIZING PROJECT,
THE PEOPLE’S PLAN FOR POLICE-FREE SCHOOLS (2019), https://blackorganizingproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/07/The-Peoples-Plan-2019-Online-Reduced-Size.pdf.
79
BLACK ORGANIZING PROJECT, supra note 78, at 3. The resolution eliminated the separate Oakland
School Police Department (a department separate from the Oakland Police Department) and directed the
superintendent “to reallocate the school police funds to student support positions.” BOP had been seeking
the abolition of the Oakland School Police Department for years, and this was a significant win.
80
The George Floyd Resolution, BLACK ORGANIZING PROJECT, https://blackorganizingproject.org/georgefloyd-resolution/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2021).
81
Id.
82
Testimony of the Washington Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs Budget Oversight
Hearing of the Committee on Education and the Committee of the Whole of the Council of the District of
Columbia, WASHINGTON LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS AND URBAN AFFAIRS (2020),
https://www.washlaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/WLC-Education-Budget-Testimony-June-2020.pdf.
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Black Swan Academy, a youth-focused organization, has been at the forefront of the call
for Police Free Schools in the District of Columbia. Black Swan Academy demands that
the District “DIVEST from all form of police in D.C. schools including DC police officers
and security officers contracted through the Metropolitan Police Department” and
“INVEST in resources that will create a safer, healthier, more equitable environment.”83
2. Abolition Versus Reform
BOP and Black Swan Academy illustrate the Police Free Schools Movement’s
abolitionist nature. In the context of policing, abolition means more than removal of police
officers from school campuses. Payne-Tsoupros and Johnson position the abolitionism of
the Police Free Schools Movement within Professor Liat Ben-Moshe’s “disepistemology”
of abolition wherein Ben-Moshe defines “carceral locales” as:
referring to more than prisons to encompass a variety of enclosures such as
psychiatric hospitals, detention centers and residential institutions for
people with disabilities, to name a few. By “carceral” I am also referring to
not only physical spaces but to particular logics and discourses that
abolition (penal/prison/carceral) opposes.84
Ben-Moshe’s framing of “carceral locales” is consistent with Professor Maryam
Ahranjani’s discussion of “prisonization” of schools: “Prisonization practices are policies
and procedures that treat students like prisoners, even unintentionally. Policies usually
manifest as zero tolerance policies, and procedures often include the installation of metal
detectors, surveillance cameras, security personal, and armed faculty and staff on school
campuses.”85 As opposed to the current carceral, “prisonization” of schools, the Police Free
Schools Movement seeks to “move beyond the removal of school police, by changing the
culture of policing with the goal of “building a new liberatory education system.”
School policing exists within the greater system of policing. At the same time as
youth-led advocacy groups called for police-free schools, growing demands to “defund”
and “abolish” the police in the spring and summer 2020 uprisings against police brutality
brought greater attention to policing generally. Related to recognizing the goals of the
Police Free Schools Movement as broader than removing officers from school building,
abolitionist organizers have sought to clarify that the demands to “defund the police”
extend beyond reducing the police budget. As an example, organizers behind the “Stop
Police Terror Project DC” in the District of Columbia, include the following as part of its
“#DefundMPD” initiative: movement in the District of Columbia, define “defunding the
police” as:
Defund the DC Metropolitan Police Department.
Ban Stop-and-Frisk In DC.
De-Militarize The DC Police.
83

Police-Free Schools, BLACK SWAN ACADEMY, https://www.blackswanacademy.org/policefree-schools
(last visited Oct. 13, 2021).
84
Liat Ben-Moshe, Dis-epistemologies for Abolition, 26 CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY 341, 342 (2018).
85
Ahranjani, supra note 45, at 278.
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All Forms Of Police Out Of DC Schools.
Protection For Sex Workers.
Dissolve Police Unions.
No New Jail.
Defund Metro Transit Police.
End DC Government Collusion With ICE.86

Thus, efforts to remove school police are part of a broader effort to abolish police and
invest the associated funds in communities.
Divesting from police represents one strategy toward the goal of dismantling the
deeply entrenched policing culture and infrastructure. In this way, the Police Free Schools
Movement reflects the theory of DisCrit in the framing of school policing as a systemic
issue. In contrast, reforms that rely on the current structures, with schools as a “carceral
locale,” do not challenge the system in the same way. While traditional reform and the
Police Free Schools Movement highlight perhaps a bright line between reform of school
police and abolition of school police, Ben-Moshe explains that “[i]n practice, reform and
abolition are on a continuum,” citing distinctions in prison abolitionist literature between
“reformist reforms” and “non-reformist reforms.”87 The former “are situated in the status
quo, so that any changes are made within or against the existing framework.”88 In contrast,
“[n]on-reformist reforms imagine a different horizon and are not limited by a discussion of
what is possible at present.”89 In this continuum, youth organizers, such as BOP and Black
Swan Academy, push for “a new liberatory education system” that contravenes the current
system of policing.
Illustrating Ben-Moshe’s argument that reform and abolition exist on a continuum in
practice, while BOP and Black Swan Academy have explicitly abolitionist goals, they also
have won certain discrete reforms. For example, BOP won a school district-wide complaint
system and also successfully pressured the Oakland Unified School District to enter into a
memorandum of understanding with the Oakland School Police Department.90 In the
District of Columbia, under pressure from Black Swan Academy and other stakeholders,
the Council of the District of Columbia voted to move the security contract for the District
of Columbia Public Schools from the Metropolitan Police Department to the school
district.91 In addition, the District of Columbia’s State Board of Education, an independent
agency that provides advocacy and policy guidance to the District of Columbia Public
Schools, passed a resolution recognizing the importance of removing police from District
of Columbia schools.92 These reforms, however, fall short of the organizers’ demands, as
86

#DefundMPD, STOP POLICE TERROR PROJECT DC, https://www.sptdc.com/defund-mpd (last visited Oct.
13, 2021).
87
Ben-Moshe, supra note 84, at 348–49 (citing THOMAS MATHIESEN, THE POLITICS OF ABOLITION (1974)).
Cf. Ahrajani, supra note 45, at 300–01 (explaining that “defunding” the police refers to “right-sizing”
police departments while “abolishing” school police would mean “completely defund school police,
remove zero tolerance policies, eliminate threat harassment regimes, abolish restraint and seclusion, and
stop or curb other prisonization practices”).
88
Ben-Moshe, supra note 84, at 348.
89
Id.
90
See ADVANCEMENT PROJECT & ALL. FOR EDUC. JUST., supra note 18.
91
BLACK SWAN ACADEMY, supra note 82 (follow “Download Police-Free Schools Toolkit” hyperlink).
92
State Board of Education, SR20-10, Resolution to Recognize the Importance of Removing All Police from
D.C. Public and Charter Schools, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION (July 15, 2020),
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they leave the police infrastructure intact.
In viewing reform and abolition on a continuum, recent and robust reforms that seek
to challenge the broader culture of enhanced security and surveillance in schools, such as
those proposed by Professor Jason Nance, may be illustrative. These broader reforms
include eliminating zero-tolerance policies; reducing or eliminating the use of other
enhanced security measures, such as “metal detectors, drug-sniffing dogs, drug testing, and
random searches of students’ lockers, personal belongings, and persons;” “dramatically”
reducing the numbers of students expelled, suspended or referred to law enforcement;
replacing harsh disciplinary approaches with evidence-based approaches to improve the
school climate and school safety; and trainings and strategies to reduce teacher bias.93 Thus,
these more robust reforms move closer to the abolition of school police that many youth
organizers seek.
3. Envisioning a Police-Free School
A common question in the context of contemplating the abolition of school police is
what to do instead. Who will stop a school shooter? Who will break up fights? What if kids
have drugs at school? These questions reflect the view of school police as protectors,
despite the data showing that (1) there is no evidence regarding SROs’ deterrence of school
shootings and (2) SROs are much more often involved in low-level school discipline
infractions.94 This question also shows the entrenchment of the carceral or “prisonization”
view of schools, and the influence of the deceptive perception of SROs on laws and
policies.
As noted above, the Police Free Schools employs a broader vision than solely
removing officers and continuing schooling under the status quo. Instead, it encompasses
the entirety of “reforms” proposed by Nance, adopted in a school- and community-specific
manner. Moreover, the vision of a police-free school is not novel: it is the current schooling
environment for many children across the United States, in schools that are comprised of
predominantly upper-middle class white students. One of many impediments to this “new
liberatory education system” is the presence of SROs. The next Part therefore proposes a
mechanism to remove police from schools as one step toward a “new liberatory education
system.”
III. STATE LAW HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY AS A MECHANISM TO REMOVE POLICE FROM
SCHOOLS
As set forth above, too often school police make schools unsafe for many Black
students, including Black students with disabilities. Further, traditional reforms, such as
better training and grievance procedures, do not disrupt the legal and historical
infrastructure of school policing and do not meet the demands of many students most
affected by school police.
This Part proposes subjecting state and local laws and policies that install police in
schools to a standard of heightened judicial scrutiny based on the state right to education.
https://simbli.eboardsolutions.com/Meetings/Attachment.aspx?S=9000&AID=180499&MID=6006.
93
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See supra Part I.B.
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Federal courts apply strict scrutiny to state laws that infringe upon fundamental rights or
suspect classifications.95 Under a strict scrutiny analysis, a law must be narrowly tailored
to meet a compelling government interest.96 In federal court, the heightened analysis of
strict scrutiny often results in the striking down of the law in question. The U.S. Supreme
Court has declined to recognize the right to education as a fundamental right.97 This Article
therefore proposes using the state right to education as the mechanism to trigger heightened
scrutiny. This Article argues that the use of SROs is an inappropriate means to achieve the
ends of school safety.
Every state provides a state law right to education. This Part proposes a theory by
which the use of SROs would face heightened scrutiny in state court, via the state right to
education. In doing so, this Part seeks to extend the theory proposed by Professor Derek
Black in his 2016 article “Reforming School Discipline” in the Northwestern University
Law Review, regarding the use of heightened scrutiny in state court as a mechanism to limit
suspensions and expulsions.98 Black’s argument connects educational equality with
discipline practices, specifically focusing on suspension and expulsion. Black argued that
these practices undermine the state’s role to provide an adequate or equal education to all
students.99 This Article seeks to expand this argument to the use of SROs in a manner
consistent with DisCrit principles.
This Part begins with a brief overview of the right to education as it currently exists
at the federal and state level, including the significance of a fundamental right to education
and the protections it provides. It then discusses the framework articulated by Black to use
the state law right to education as the mechanism to enact a heightened level of judicial
scrutiny for suspensions and expulsions. The concern driving Black’s proposal mirrors that
raised in this Article: the disproportionate punishment imposed on Black children,
including Black children with disabilities. Thus, this Article suggests extending Black’s
proposal to SROs. Additionally, this Part explores why extending Black’s proposal aligns
with the DisCrit analysis discussed in Part II.
This Part closes with a discussion acknowledging both the legal and political
limitations regarding this proposal as a mechanism to remove police from schools. Despite
these limitations, this Article concludes that pursuing the state right to education is the most
viable option by which to secure relief from SROs in the near term. Critically, this
mechanism also functions to pursue abolition of school police—not reform. This Article
proffers that the removal of school police via state law heightened scrutiny can be one step
among many in dismantling the broader school-to-prison pipeline.
A. Right to Education
The U.S. Constitution is silent with respect to a right to education, and the U.S.
Supreme Court declined to imply such a right. Since the Court’s 1973 decision in San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, which held that the U.S. Constitution
does not include an implied right to education,100 adjudication of school reform has largely
95
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taken place in state court, with mixed success. Since the Rodriguez decision, advocates
have continued to advance a myriad of theories arguing for a fundamental right to
education.
This section briefly surveys the theories articulating the need for and the existence
of the federal right to education to provide context for the proposal that follows to remove
police from schools, as well as state court litigation around the right to education.101 This
section also discusses the significance of heightened scrutiny in right to education cases. If
education constitutes a fundamental right, then infringement upon it should impose a
heightened form of judicial scrutiny. This standard gives the least deference toward the
government actor, in this case the state or the local school board who installs the SRO,
thereby providing greater agency to students bringing constitutional claims.
1. Right to Education Under Federal and State Law
In “Implying a Federal Constitutional Right to Education,” Black categorizes the
main theories as falling on grounds of equal protection, substantive due process, minimally
adequate fundamental right to education, a hybrid of equal protection and substantive due
process, and originalism.102
Recent federal court litigation has relied on these theories in arguing for a
fundamental right to education. For example, in a tumultuous trajectory of orders and
reversals, the fundamental federal right to education was temporarily revived in spring
2020 with the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Gary B. v. Whitmer.103 The plaintiffs were Detroit
schoolchildren who alleged, among other things, that the state of Michigan had violated
their access to literacy under the Due Process Clause because of the school system’s
teacher vacancies, building hazards, and overcrowding, among other conditions.104 While
the district court ruled for the State of Michigan, holding that access to literacy was not a
fundamental right under the federal Due Process Clause, the Sixth Circuit reversed the
lower court’s ruling on the “central claim,” declaring that “the Constitution provides a
fundamental right to a basic minimum education.”105 This case relied on the “minimally
adequate education” theory of a right to education.106 Less than a month after the decision,
after the parties reached a settlement, the Sixth Circuit issued an en banc opinion sua sponte
101

See A FEDERAL RIGHT TO EDUCATION: FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS FOR OUR DEMOCRACY (Kimberly
Jenkins Robinson ed., 2019) for a thorough analysis of the arguments around the federal right to education,
including its existence and scope [hereinafter A FEDERAL RIGHT TO EDUCATION].
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Black summarizes each of these theories. Broadly, equal protection means “that education encompasses
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education therein,” Derek W. Black, Implying a Federal Constitutional Right to Education, in A FEDERAL
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which vacated the Sixth Circuit’s panel decision.107 The Court then dismissed the case. The
Sixth Circuit panel decision has no precedential value. With the exception of the shortlived victory in Gary B. v. Whitmer, right to education cases have, thus far, not had success
in federal court.
Post-Rodriguez, reformers turned to state court, relying on language in state
constitutions to challenge school finance systems. While the claims appear largely the
same, they differ in that the state law claims rely on clauses in the state constitution. Every
state constitution includes an affirmative duty to deliver education. Typically, states frame
the right as an obligation to provide an “equal” or “adequate” education.108 Reformers use
these provisions in school funding litigation. Under the “equity” theory, which marked the
“second wave” of school finance litigation from 1973 to 1989, plaintiffs argued that
inequities in school funding schemes violated state constitutional requirements to provide
an equal opportunity to education (generally meaning equal spending).109 Rose v. Council
for Better Education110 marks the “third wave” of school finance litigation, in which the
Kentucky Supreme Court held that the state must provide students an “adequate”
education.111 Under the adequacy theory, plaintiffs argued for a certain minimum threshold
of school funding that would provide what the state deemed an adequate level of resources
to all students.112
The adequacy and equity theories are necessarily interrelated, and plaintiffs have
continued to pursue school-funding claims based on both theories.113 This Article looks to
school-funding litigation, because that is the body of law interpreting the education clauses
in state constitutions.
2. Significance of a Fundamental Right: Heightened Scrutiny
The U.S. Constitution protects fundamental rights at the highest level from
government encroachment. Fundamental rights include the right to marry, privacy,
contraception, travel, voting, custody of one’s children, and procreation. If education
constituted a federal fundamental right, the scrupulous protections afforded to it could act
107
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as a powerful mechanism to remove police from schools. Alleged governmental
infringements of fundamental rights trigger an analysis under strict scrutiny.114 To survive
strict scrutiny, a law must be (i) narrowly tailored (the means) (ii) to achieve a compelling
government interest (the ends).115 Laws not meeting that standard will be struck down as
unconstitutional.116 The standard of review often determines the outcome of the case. In its
1992 opinion in Burson v. Freeman, the U.S. Supreme Court stated: “It is a rare case in
which we have held that a law survives strict scrutiny.”117 Generally, when analyzing laws
not subject to strict scrutiny (because they do not infringe upon a fundamental right or
create a suspect classification), courts will apply the rational basis test. A law will survive
rational basis if the law is rationally related to a legitimate government interest.
Scholars have argued extensively for a federal fundamental right to education, as
noted above. Given the reluctance of the federal courts to find such a right to education,
this path appears closed for the foreseeable future. For this reason, this Article considers
the heightened judicial scrutiny mechanisms of state court. While relying on state courts
has limitations, as discussed below, the use of heightened judicial scrutiny in state court
creates a mechanism by which to subject the use of SROs to heightened scrutiny.
While standards of scrutiny in state court generally operate in a similar fashion to
that in federal court when employing a version of a heightened scrutiny or rational basis
test, there are certain differences. In the federal context, “[l]egislative means that are based
on suspect classifications or that burden fundamental rights rarely withstand strict scrutiny
(because they are usually not necessary, narrowly tailored, or least restrictive.)”118 In
addition, the ends themselves are typically not challenged as much due to separation of
powers concerns, as ends scrutiny in particular can be viewed as encroaching upon the
other branches of government.119
In contrast, Professor Joshua E. Weishart chronicled that the state court heightened
scrutiny in school funding challenges has transformed into a “bare bones means-ends
review.”120 Interestingly, and especially relevant for this Article, state courts have focused
more on the “ends” analysis, which Weishart argued has developed into an “ends-to-fit”
review.121 Weishart explains that in education clause cases, the means-ends analysis has
been applied differently than in other contexts. In other contexts, courts scrutinize both the
means and the ends under an analysis of “(1) the legislative means, (2) the legislative or
constitutional ends, and (3) the fit between the means and the ends.”122 In other words, the
court examines (1) what the law actually requires or prohibits, (2) the goals of the law, and
(3) how well what the law requires or prohibits serves the goals of the law. This analysis
114
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allows the court to interrogate the means and the ends, as well as how well the means serve
the ends. In contrast, Professor Weishart explains that in education clause cases, (1) “ends
scrutiny has not been used to ‘smoke out’ illicit motives or improper purposes,”123 because
the state education clause sets forth the purpose for the legislation and courts have generally
continued to assume that legislators acted in “good faith,” despite finding “the excuses for
legislative inaction unsatisfactory or intolerable;” and (2) “means scrutiny . . . has been
notably absent in school finance cases.”124
Courts have found that educational clauses in state constitutions create rights or
duties in school finance litigation. In these cases, “courts have held that students can
enforce education clauses in state constitutions against the state.”125 Thus, as Black states,
these cases have a “direct bearing on school discipline,”126 and this Article argues that
SROs do as well.
B. Proposal: Subject the Use of SROs to State Law Heightened Scrutiny
Under a novel theory advanced by Black to promote school discipline reform efforts,
Black uses the affirmative right to education and the duties found in state constitutions to
advance two arguments to protect students from suspensions and expulsions. First, Black
argues that students have a state constitutionally protected individual right to education.127
Suspensions and expulsions interfere with this right and therefore should trigger heightened
scrutiny.128 Black argues that this framing would force states to justify suspension and
expulsion, the practical effect of which would be to prompt schools to engage in
pedagogically sound practices.129 Second, Black argues that disciplinary practices that
undermine educational quality violate the state constitution’s obligation to provide an equal
or adequate education to all students.130 Therefore, state constitutions should require states
to intervene by reforming school discipline practices and improving the educational
climate.131
123
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This section begins by summarizing Black’s proposals. This section then explores
how these arguments could extend to the use of SROs. This section first considers, drawing
on Black’s work, how plaintiffs could challenge the use of SROs as interfering with their
constitutionally protected right to education. Then, this section addresses how plaintiffs
could show that the use of SROs means that the state failed in its duty to deliver an adequate
or equal educational opportunity. This section then situates this new challenge to SROs in
DisCrit principles, specifically with respect to acknowledging the historical and legal
power structures and centering the concerns of those most affected by school policing.
Finally, this section addresses the limitations of this proposal, both legal and political.
1. Summary of Black’s Theory that Expulsions and Suspensions Violate the State Law
Right to Education
Black argues that students have a constitutional right to education, and exclusion
from school via suspension or expulsion violates this right.132 All state constitutions contain
an affirmative duty to provide education.133 Tracing decisions in school finance litigation
that focused on the obligation of the state to provide an “equal” or “adequate” education,
Black argues that most court decisions have assumed or applied an individual right
framework, even if not explicitly stated.134 Black notes that education in state law evolved
as courts in over half of states recognize education as a constitutional right of students or a
constitutional duty of states.135 Black uses these findings to support the proposition that
“students have an individual constitutional right to education under state constitutions that
schools cannot simply take away without meeting some form of heightened scrutiny.”136
Black derives several principles developed in school finance litigation with
implications for school discipline, which are discussed here and subsequently extended to
the use of SROs. First, “courts have held that students can enforce education clauses in
state constitutions against the state.”137 With respect to school discipline, this means that a
student who is removed from the educational setting is denied access to a constitutional
right.138 Second, in most state court school funding cases, “the precise legal challenge . . .
is based on the theory that the state must ensure that existing educational inputs and
opportunities are sufficient to produce academic success.”139 If the school discipline policy
affects overall education, then the state assumes an obligation to intervene.140 Third, “states
have an obligation to ensure that their education policies and practices—even if good in
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theory or effective for most students—work for those students who are most in need.”141
Because of the disproportionality in how “at-risk” students are subject to harsh disciplinary
practice, this should trigger the state’s obligation to help these students to overcome
academic barriers—rather than making it solely the responsibility of the students.142
Fourth, the state constitutional right to education is broad enough “to encompass any
number of educational policies that affect educational opportunity.”143 Thus, school
discipline is within the scope of the state constitution education clause.144 Fifth, “the state
is ultimately responsible for the educational opportunities that students do and do not
receive.”145 Thus, states ultimately have responsibility over school discipline.146
Black proposes focusing on suspensions and expulsions imposed for minor student
misbehavior, because (1) these cases would merit an analysis of the “ends” in that this sort
of misbehavior is not a threat to school safety and (2) excluding students via suspension or
expulsion for routine misbehavior would show that these exclusions are overbroad and not
narrowly tailored to the means.147 Black therefore frames the question as “whether the state
has a sufficient justification and narrowly tailored method for withdrawing that right [to
education] from students who do not pose a serious threat to safety or order.”148 The state
would then be unable to show “any clear, important, or compelling interests in excluding
students for minor misbehavior. Even if it does [demonstrate the requisite interest], far less
intrusive means are available to achieve the state’s interests, which narrowly tailoring
would require.”149 Thus, if there is a constitutional right to education, then the state would
be unable to justify taking away the right to education (by suspension or expulsion) for
minor misbehavior that does not pose any serios safety threat when there are other
strategies available that do not deprive students of the right to education.
Black’s second argument explicitly connects educational climate and discipline
policy. Black argues that discipline policies and practices that undermine quality education
violate the state’s obligation to provide an equal and adequate education to all students.150
Black uses social science research to contextualize individual student misbehavior and the
associated discipline decisions within broader school culture. Challenging the premise that
excluding misbehaving students benefits the learning environment for everyone else, Black
highlights education research findings that high suspension rates depress academic
achievement, highlighting that the school’s response to student misbehavior affects the
learning environment.151 Black highlights the need for preventative, proactive, and
supportive approaches to student discipline, rather than exclusion.152 Importantly, Black
notes the racial discrepancies in how punitive practices are meted out to children:
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For decades, social science has attributed the racial achievement gap to
poverty, segregation, and unequal access to resources. No doubt, these
factors still influence the achievement gap. But recent studies reveal that a
substantial portion of the achievement gap is attributable to problematic
discipline policy and practices, which just so happens to be more prevalent
in predominantly poor and minority schools.153
Black contextualizes the social science research on school discipline within the
state’s duty to provide and equal or adequate education. Under this theory, states have the
responsibility and obligation to ensure equal or adequate opportunities, which “extends
beyond just money to nearly any educational policy or practice that deprives students of
the educational opportunity their state constitution mandates. It also includes monitoring
and supporting local districts to ensure students receive these opportunities.”154 Black cites
social science research that underpins the connection between discipline, school quality,
and academic achievement, specifically research around quality schools and orderly
environments, low quality schools, and disproportionate effects on minority students.155
The inquiry under this theory is “whether the state is carrying out its constitutional
duty to provide equal and adequate educational opportunities.”156 The plaintiff must
establish the state’s constitutional duty to deliver education and that “(i) this duty includes
the duty to maintain effective discipline policies, (ii) the ineffective discipline policy causes
a substantial educational harm, (iii) the state (not the student or another factor) is the cause
of the harm, and (iv) strategies are available to reduce or remedy the harm.”157 This is not
new doctrine—the plaintiffs would need to make an “evidentiary case connecting
discipline policies and data to school quality and achievement.”158
2. Extension of Black’s Theory to Challenge the Use of School Police
This section extends Black’s theory to the use of SROs. Building on Black’s
proposal, which makes a claim that expulsions and suspensions violate students’ rights to
equal and adequate education, this section first extends that argument to the use of SROs.
Then this section considers the argument that the use of SROs interferes with the state’s
duty to provide quality education. This section situates these proposals within DisCrit,
exploring how the proposals seriously reckon with the legal and historical infrastructure of
school policing. This section contends that of the two proposals, the individual rights theory
would be more effective at removing school police and is more aligned with DisCrit (as
well as with the goals of youth organizers).
There are several limitations to this proposal, addressed below, including the lack of
clarity in state courts regarding a consistent formulation and application of a standard for
claims warranting heightened scrutiny, and the politics around school policing. Despite
these limitations, this Article contends that in this political moment, removing police from
schools has more support than ever before.
153
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a. Use of SROs violates state law right to education
This section builds on Black’s theories, described above, extending them to the use
of SROs. First, this section prposes challenging the use of school police on the grounds
that the presence of SROs deprives students of their right to education under state law.
Second, this section argues that the use of SROs interferes with the state’s obligation to
provide students a quality education.
i. Use of SROs interferes with constitutional right to education
Black argues that students have an individual right to education based on precedent
established in school finance litigation cases.159 Under this theory, the deprivation of
education via suspension or expulsion should trigger heightened scrutiny.160 With respect
to the individual constitutional right to education, the argument attacking SROs is arguably
more complex. As noted above, if a student is suspended or expelled—and therefore
removed from the learning environment—that student has been deprived of their
constitutional right to education, which should then trigger heightened scrutiny. In the
context of SROs, the student may be removed from the learning environment via arrest by
an SRO; in addition, students may also experience learning disruptions by the presence of
SROs more broadly within the school.
In the context of SROs, advocates could frame the lens for the deprivation of
education as encompassing academic deprivation as well as the related fear, intimidation,
and violence experienced by many students in the context of school policing. BOP reported
an analysis from the California Healthy Kids Survey which demonstrated that compared to
white peers, children of color reported feeling less safe with police presence in their
communities and schools, with Black students the least likely to report that police made
them feel safer.161 As discussed earlier, prior studies demonstrate that SROs can disrupt
the learning environment by “alienating students and generating mistrust.”162 This sort of
culture, where children do not feel safe in the learning environment, should be considered
in a deprivation of education analysis.
Arrests by SROs are a more obvious example of a deprivation of education, as the
arrested student is removed from the learning environment. An arrest is a significant event.
Professor Jason Nance details the harsh academic and socio-emotional consequences of an
arrest.163 For example, schools may refuse to readmit the student; the student may face
159
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embarrassment and stigma if readmitted; the student may face increased monitoring by
school officials and SROs; the student is likely to incur lower standardized test scores; and
the student has a higher likelihood of dropping out and of interaction with the criminal
justice system.164 While arrests may be what generates public attention and outcry, school
police are an issue in schools at a much wider (and complex) level vis-à-vis the arrested
student. Arrest and threat of arrest are part of the broader culture of school policing and
affect more students than the one arrested. As noted above, there is greater police presence
in poor schools with high numbers of Black and brown students. Research shows that
greater police presence in schools leads to higher prevalence of interaction with school
police. This increased interaction with school police leads to a host of negative outcomes,
including higher numbers of arrests and referrals to law enforcement, and higher rates of
dropping out of school, which are disproportionately borne by Black children with
disabilities. While this type of deprivation of education is less concrete than physical
removal from school via arrest (or via suspension or expulsion), these increased rates of
negative outcomes should constitute an increased risk of deprivation of education on a
systemic basis.
Another possible avenue when considering deprivation of education via SROs could
be similar to the plaintiffs’ allegations in the Gary B. complaint. The plaintiffs cited, among
other things: the schools’ “decrepit and unsafe physical conditions.”165 As noted earlier,
Gary B. was a federal right to education case that was ultimately unsuccessful. However,
advocates in other jurisdictions have picked up on this “unsafe” theme and extended its
application. For example, in Deminsky v. Pitt County Board of Education, North Carolina
Advocates for Justice submitted an amicus curaie brief on behalf of the plaintiffs’ claim of
a violation of the right to education under the North Carolina constitution.166 Noting that
Gary B. considered “safety” in the context of the facilities themselves, the North Carolina
Advocates for Justice sought to apply “safety” to the context of physical and sexual
harassment: “[T]he foundational premise remains the same: the physical safety and security
of students is a necessary prerequisite to student learning, and, indeed to the provision of a
constitutionally adequate education.”167 Advocates might consider similar framings with
respect to claiming SROs interfere with students’ constitutional right to education.
Once the prima facie case is established, the burden then shifts to the state to (i)
defend the use of SROs as narrowly tailored (the means) and (ii) achieve the compelling
interest of school safety (the ends). With respect to the means, this Article contends that
the widespread use of school police is not narrowly tailored. In state court, means scrutiny
is largely absent in school funding challenges, essentially to avoid separation of powers
concerns.168 In contrast, this Article favors a more traditional means-ends testing where the
theft and vandalism, than they would be without law enforcement; and students of color and students with
disabilities are disproportionately harmed” (citation omitted)).
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means (providing school safety through the use of SROs) are actually scrutinized. Under
such an analysis, a court is unlikely to consider as narrowly tailored the installation of
SROs in schools with wide-ranging authority. Strict scrutiny may be more workable in this
context than in school funding cases because this argument is essentially a negative rights
argument—a right not to be subject to SROs and the abuse therefrom. This analysis makes
no affirmative demands on the state to improve school safety or eliminate disparities, other
than those caused by the SROs. In contrast, in school funding cases, the plaintiffs seek
additional funds from the state.
A question at this point may be—what if the use of SROs was narrowly tailored, by
ensuring some version of the reforms set forth above? For example, many people have
called for various kinds of SRO reform, including specialized training for working with
children, particularly for working with children with disabilities, and clarity about the
specific duties of the SRO. Other types of SRO reforms promote creating a grievance
procedure available to students and families and ensuring that the school principal has the
authority to remove an SRO.169 To what extent does this analysis change if the SROs are
well trained, have specific training around children with disabilities, school staff does not
call them in for discipline issues, or they have a very limited role in the school that is
perhaps focused on the educator or counselor role with some security-guard type functions?
In this theory, the argument would be that the SRO role is too broad, not that the SROs are
inherently problematic. In response, this Article contends that it is superficial to view the
SRO role as separate from the broader culture of school criminalization/ “prisonization” as
discussed in Part II. The criminalization of school discipline and “prisonization” of schools
means that SROs cannot actually be narrowly tailored.
With respect to the ends of school safety, this Article does not question the state’s
authority to determine the interests of its citizens. Rather, this Article asks to consider
safety for which children. Black children are disproportionately affected by school policing
yet are too often not the stakeholders considered when analyzing school policing. The ends
set forth in the state constitution provide some form of a constitutionally adequate
education, which this Article is not challenging.
ii. Use of SROs interferes with a state’s duty to provide quality education
Black’s second argument uses the state’s obligation to provide an equal or adequate
education to challenge disciplinary practices under the theory that the practice interferes
169
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with a state’s duty to provide quality education. If discipline policy affects overall
education, then the state is obligated to intervene. As noted above, this claim requires
establishing four elements. First, that the state’s constitutional duty to deliver education
includes the duty to keep children safe from harm, such as harm from SROs. An alternative
framework could mirror Black’s argument—the duty includes the duty to maintain
effective discipline policies, as an alternative way to attack the use of SROs. However,
while Black establishes that the discipline policies should fall within the scope of the duty
to provide an adequate or equitable education, this analysis differs with respect to SROs.
Best practices of SROs provide that SROs should not be involved in formal school
discipline.170 While practice shows that SROs are, in fact, frequently involved in school
discipline, this element may pose an obstacle. As noted above, the equity and adequacy
clauses are typically broad enough to encompass policies and practices that affect
educational outcomes and therefore are within the scope.171 Black cites as examples
lawsuits challenging school districting boundaries, teacher tenure, and a state’s cap on the
number of charter schools when exploring the breadth of the scope of claims that state
courts have held fall within the scope of a right to education.172 Thus, because the scope of
the right is broad, the use of SROs should fall within the breadth of this right. As in the
context of suspensions and expulsions, the breadth of the scope of the right to educational
opportunity “rests on [the] foundational principal [that] the state is ultimately responsible
for the educational opportunities that students do and do not receive.”173
As Black notes, the challenge is “in making the factual showing that the policy or
practice in question—whatever it might be—is the actual cause of substantial and
systematic injury to students.”174 In the context of suspensions and expulsions, when a
student is physically removed from the learning environment, “the student is losing access
to a constitutional right or an opportunity that the state is constitutionally obligated to
deliver,” which should therefore trigger heightened scrutiny.175 Thus, while the school
district may attempt to counter that the use of SROs may not formally fall within school
discipline, it is fair to position their use as an educational policy or practice because the use
of SROs falls within the “category of educational policies that affect education
outcomes.”176
Second, with respect to showing that the policy—the use of SROs—causes a
substantial educational harm, plaintiffs would need to establish that the policy (i) affects
students’ educational opportunities, and (ii) those effects are substantial enough to deprive
students of an equal or adequate education—in other words, the harms are significant
170
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enough to rise to the level of a constitutional harm.177 Black notes that this causation
element is the most challenging for plaintiffs because social science data “rarely establish
causation in any absolute sense”—instead, social science research shows some level of
correlation from which courts must infer a causal relationship.178 In the context of
suspension and expulsion, Black pointed to studies showing that negative climates, high
suspension rates, and disorderly environment affect educational opportunity.179 Black also
relied on Nance’s empirical study to establish the connection between discipline and the
overall educational quality of the school.180 While a similar challenge with respect to
causation exists with SROs, advocates could highlight the research on the negative effects
of SROs discussed earlier. Advocates could also make use of students’ personal testimonies
and expert statements as ways to show a deprivation of education.
With respect to the third element, the state’s responsibility for the harm (in this case,
the use of SROs)—unlike the challenges to expulsion and suspension policies—appears
more straightforward. The state bears the ultimate responsibility for installing the SROs in
schools.
Finally, with respect to remedies—the state has viable remedies available. In the
context of suspensions and expulsions, Black cites to research regarding the prevention of
student misbehavior.181 By training and investing in school staff and developmentally
appropriate behavior supports and interventions, schools can minimize some of the
unwanted behaviors and punitive reactions. With respect to SROs, remedies are to
“improve” or remove the SROs. The funds currently allocated to SROs should be
reinvested into mental health, counseling, and other services, consistent with the demands
of youth organizers.
Much of Black’s analysis regarding the pros and cons of the two approaches transfers
to the proposals here. Black stresses the interrelatedness of his two proposals, with the
second (systemic) proposal as the one with the most potential for widespread change in the
context of school discipline reform.182 The factual causation challenges that Black
identifies will be shared in the context of school policing.
In the context of school policing, the heightened scrutiny theory is more aligned with
the abolitionist framework whereas the systemic claim is more reform-spirited. Given the
crisis of school policing and the entrenchment of the school policing infrastructure, which
makes successful reform arguably unlikely, this Article prioritizes a mechanism by which
to remove police. As discussed further below, the success of any effort to remove school
police depends in large part on political will.
b. Positioning the proposal within DisCrit
DisCrit privileges the perspectives of marginalized populations, “traditionally not
acknowledged within research” and “requires activism and supports all forms of
resistance.”183 These tenets, in conjunction with the others previously mentioned, direct
177
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that proposals and solutions support and highlight the demands of those who are most
impacted by school policing. Most significant for this Article, DisCrit “considers legal and
historical aspects of dis/ability and race and how both have been used separately and
together to deny the rights of some citizens.”184 Thus, an approach that supports students
most likely to be affected by school police; namely Black children, including Black
children with disabilities, is consistent with DisCrit.
Black’s framing of student misbehavior as a function of school culture is consistent
with DisCrit principles, because his framing recognizes the power structures around school
discipline. It provides a framework where student misbehavior can be appropriately viewed
as a response to the decisions made by the adults around them, instead of, as Black notes,
a framework where the interests of the “good” kids are balanced against the interests of the
“bad” kids.185 It shifts—or at least shares—the responsibility for school discipline from the
students to the schools and teachers. This shift is important because teachers and other
school personnel are the ones with the power to change these practices. Related, Black’s
framing represents a shift from the “deficit” model too often (and wrongly) attributed to
poor and minoritized children.186 Black’s analysis therefore puts the responsibility for
change on a broader institutional level.
The Police Free Schools Movement seeks the removal of police from schools as one
of several goals toward dismantling the carceral system of education. The proposal to
subject the use of SROs to heightened scrutiny based on state law is one way to achieve
this goal. This proposal challenges the school policing apparatus in a way that recognizes
how school police have been weaponized against Black children. By pursuing a strategy
where the use of school police is subject to heightened scrutiny, the proposal places
responsibility for change on the party in power—the school and state. In this way, the
proposal contemplates the legal and historical infrastructure that has been used to
marginalize segments of the population. The heightened scrutiny standard puts the burden
where it belongs—on the party in power to make change.
c. Limitations of the proposal
There are several limitations to relying on the heightened judicial scrutiny in state
court as the mechanism used to remove police from schools. There are both legal
limitations, and—perhaps most importantly—political limitations.
With respect to legal limitations, as Black noted, while there are strong indications
that there is an individual right to education in state court that can be enforced via the equity
or adequacy clause of the state constitution, this right has not been explicitly declared as
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fundamental by every state court.187 Moreover, numerous state courts have not yet
explicitly declared a right to education based on the language of the constitution.188
Beyond this specific proposal, there are other limitations to pursuing state court relief
in education cases more generally. Professor Kimberly Jenkins Robinson notes that state
court challenges in urban minority districts often face more intense resistance to change
because relief often depends on states having sympathetic and powerful coalitions.189
Robinson explains how history demonstrates that a federal response is more effective than
depending on states to effect meaningful change, citing federal school desegregation cases
and the passage of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act190 as
examples.191 This Article agrees.
Additionally, state court relief essentially amounts to a tinkering at the margins,
“while leaving the expectations of middle-class suburbanites untouched.”192 These are
potentially serious limitations; however at least with respect to Robinson’s last point, the
theory proposed in this Article has the potential to go beyond tinkering at the margins to
begin a transformation in education by removing school police.
A related political limitation to the specific proposal is the question of whether state
courts will entertain the novel theory of SROs interfering with the right to education. As
noted above, the data regarding the disproportionate effects of school policing on Black
children is not new, and despite finding after finding, these data have not resulted in
meaningful change.193 Illustrating the somewhat artificial distinction between legal and
political limitations, Senior Advisor, State and Local Partnerships a the Emerson Collective
Carmel Martin et al., in a study of fifty years of school finance litigation, determined that
“specific state constitutional language does not dictate the way a state or even federal court
will apply a right to education . . . . Instead, advocates and reformers should focus on the
policy efforts and public will to create clear change . . . .”194 Thus, advocates will need to
develop strategies to develop the political will and public narrative around school policing
necessary to effect this kind of change.
187
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Turning to anticipated political opposition, SROs typically enjoy support from
parents of schoolchildren.195 The widely shared videos of assaults on children by SROs
tend to be viewed as isolated incidents and not as a symptom of a larger problem of policing
of schools. A common question arises around concerns of who will be responsible for
investigations or who will break up fights in the absence of school police—essentially who
will do some version of policing in the absence of the police. Critiques along these lines
highlight that simply removing police is not sufficient. Removal of police needs to be in
concert with investments and training in noncarceral transformative justice resources.
SROs are often one of the first and most common heightened security measures instituted.
Yet, given the spring and summer 2020 uprisings in support of Black Lives Matter and the
associated national attention to the Police Free Schools Movement, there is now more
widespread attention on the harms caused by school policing than ever before.
CONCLUSION
While this Article focuses on harms to Black children, including Black children with
disabilities, other populations of children may be at increased risk of harm by school police
as well. There are differences in how other children of color, boys, girls, and gender
nonconforming children are subject to school discipline, including referral to law
enforcement and school-based arrest.196 These are areas that merit further research under a
DisCrit analysis.
As discussed in this Article, there are several serious considerations of how a federal
fundamental right is superior to a fundamental right based in state law. This Article does
not dispute these arguments. Right now, in our current political landscape and the current
composition of the U.S. Supreme Court, a path to federal fundamental right remains
foreclosed in the face of San Antonio v. Rodriguez. Perhaps that will change. Robinson
notes potential future change in the federal landscape. Robinson posited that despite the
losses in Gary B. and Martinez, the new cases being brought in federal court are an
indication that “advocates may develop additional theories for relief in federal court that
could spark further litigation” and “the return to federal court confirms what scholars and
advocates have contended for some time: state courts should not remain the sole arbiters
of claims regarding the inadequacies and inequities of public schools.”197 If a fundamental
right is recognized in federal court, that could be a powerful mechanism in the struggle
195
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against school policing. Right now, however, this Article seeks to direct attention to
another possible pathway to support education for our children. Heightened scrutiny in
state court is one possible mechanism to remove of school police. While SROs interfering
with a state constitutional right to education is a novel proposition, it could be a powerful
tool to effect immediate change in school policing.
The stakes for Black children in schools across the country could not be higher. The
proposals set forth in this Article seek to provide an alternative opportunity to assess school
policing. If the state court venue is an option that has not yet been foreclosed or exhausted,
it merits consideration.
At the beginning of March 2020, shortly before schools closed due to the COVID19 pandemic, a school police officer assaulted a Black four-year old with disabilities.198
Despite ubiquitous remote education throughout the country, school policing persisted
during the COVID-19 pandemic. In August 2020, three days into the new school year, a
twelve-year old Black child was suspended from virtual school for playing with a toy Nerf
gun during remote instruction.199 The school sent a police officer to the child’s home,
terrifying the family.200 In March 2021, police were called on a Black seven-year old child
with autism for taking off his face mask on the school bus, despite a doctor’s note stating
that this behavior was related to his autism and he should not be excluded from school on
that basis.201 School police are not new, nor are the disproportionate effects of school
policing on Black children. An opaque and complex web of law and policy have created
today’s massive school policing infrastructure. Given the racism and ableism underling
these laws and policies, it is not difficult to recognize that the system disproportionately
affects Black children and Black children with disabilities. Under a heightened scrutiny
framework, striking down the policies that install school police would be a blunt and
meaningful step toward a just education for all children.
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